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l An appraisal of the consequences of the Lisbon Strategy
leads to two main conclusions. Firstly, there is a need for
changing the strategy management mechanism and
reinforcing EU financial incentives to further the strategy’s
objectives. That means a closer engagement of EU
redistribution policies – particularly the cohesion policy – in
the execution of domestic reform plans. Secondly, strategy
objectives should be focused on the priority of building an
innovative and knowledge-based economy. That would also
involve the need to make necessary adjustments in the
cohesion policy.
l Poland and other new Member States clearly lag behind the
rest of Europe in terms of conducting innovation-directed
activities within the framework of the Lisbon Strategy and
exploiting structural funds. Therefore, innovation-promoting 
activities of the Lisbon Strategy and European policies must
be intensified particularly in the new Member States. The
Polish government should argue in favour of directing the
cohesion policy towards achievement of greater
pan-European cohesion in the field of economy innovation.
There is no doubt that placing the European Institute of
Technology and Innovation in Wroc³aw would greatly
contribute to the achievement of these goals.
l The new set of Lisbon priorities is increasingly dominated by
the need to counteract climate change. With this in mind,
efforts must be directed at searching for innovative solutions
in the field of energy. They will be targeting the increasing
energy needs of the EU economy, take into account
environment-protection requirements and reinforce energy
security of the European countries, for example by
decreasing the volume of foreign supplies of traditional raw
materials. These activities may also lower the cost of
adapting EU regulations introduced in response to climatic
change to the requirements of the new set of Lisbon priorities.
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Assessment of past achievements of the Lisbon Strategy
The Lisbon Strategy was adopted during the European Union summit in lateMarch 2000. It combines the desired improvement of economiccompetitiveness with social goals and sustainable economic development.
The principal problem of the Lisbon Strategy is that its priorities have been
portrayed in very general terms. Many experts consider them dispersed across too
many diverse, at times contradictory, objectives. This implies serious
consequences. The strategy does not sufficiently focus on building a modern
knowledge-based economy in Europe. The goals of the strategy cover employment
support, including greater employment flexibility on the labour market, as well as
environmental and transportation investments, particularly construction of
trans-European lines of transportation. These priorities do not always coincide with
innovation-promoting activities. In some cases, the label of expenditures consistent 
with the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy serves propaganda purposes more than
actual construction of an advanced European economy capable of competing with
the United States and Japan.
Another problem with the Lisbon Strategy is that it was based on an ineffective
management mechanism and, consequently, its implementation was ineffective.
It relied on the so-called open coordination method, which in the case of the strategy
meant that the European Commission prepared its planning guidelines which were
subsequently transposed in all little detail into national reform programs and
implemented by the Member States. Consequently, the main burden of selecting
substantive activities and implementing them rested on the Member States, whereas
the Commission had at its disposal only soft (not legally binding) instruments for
charting out general program directions and monitoring their progress in each
country. 
The low effectiveness of the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy was widely
criticized, which brought about its revision and elaboration of its new version: the
strategy for growth and employment (2005). In 2007, the three-year period of the new 
Lisbon Strategy being in effect ended and the subsequent two-year round of its
implementation began in 2008. Proposals for adjustments of the activities carried
within the framework of the Lisbon Strategy were also made at the recent 2008 spring
summit of the European Council. In this connection, several reports were prepared,
also by order of the European Commission, which analyse the effectiveness of the
strategy reformed in 2005. 
The European Commission argues in favour of the effectiveness of the strategy,
particularly as concerns the improved employment situation. Since 2005, some 6.5
million new jobs were created in Europe. However, one must bear in mind that the
rate of employment among population in the productive age increased in 2006 to 64%
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(in 27 countries of the European Union), compared to about 63% in 2004. Therefore,
statistically, that increase is relatively low, still distant from the desired rate of 70%
assumed for 2010. Considering the current slump in world economy, it is unlikely that 
such figure can be reached in the desired time frame. 
European Commission experts also point at the recent growth of productivity of the
European economy (measured according to the total factor productivity indicator).
This is a substantial change compared to earlier trends. However, even European
Commission experts admit that the change in the productivity situation is associated
more with seasonal fluctuations of the economic cycle than with structural changes in
the European economy. This is why it is difficult to credit the Lisbon Strategy for
achievements in this area. Other indicators confirm this diagnosis. For example, the
rate of economic growth is clearly slowing down in Europe, which can be ascribed
mainly to the economic crisis in the United States. The International Monetary Fund
forecasts that economic growth in the Euro zone will not exceed 1.3% in 2008. It is
worth recalling that in the period of economic slowdown in the EU, i.e. between 2000
and 2005, which contributed to the adjustment of the Lisbon Strategy, the average
rate of growth in the Euro zone amounted to 1.9% of the GDP (per capita). This may
mean that the decisive impact on shaping the economic situation in Europe is exerted
by cyclical factors and the US financial crisis rather than by structural reforms
brought about by the Lisbon Strategy. 
The flagship objective of the Lisbon Strategy is to build an innovative economy in
Europe, particularly to catch up in this field to the United States and Japan. However,
that objective is not being effectively pursued either. Compared to the year 2000
when the Lisbon Strategy was announced, expenditures on scientific research fell in
the EU from nearly 2% of the GDP to 1.85% in 2006. Many countries – including the
United Kingdom, Germany, France and the Netherlands – reduced their support for
scientific research. These trends prevent the European Union from reaching the
ambitious target of committing 3% of the GDP to scientific research by 2010.
Moreover, deep differentiations in the development of innovative economy persist
between the regions of the European Union. The report on the Seventh Framework
Program for Innovation shows persistence of a relatively stable and long-term
difference between four groups of states: (1) innovation leaders, (2) innovation
followers, (3) moderate innovators and (4) countries catching up. Poland belongs to
the last group. The internal cohesion between indicators within these groups and their
unchanging make-up indicate that the process of convergence between states in the
area of innovation is moving along rather slowly. The huge gap between the first
group of innovation leaders and the fourth group of countries catching up will take
about 100 years to close.
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Priorities of the renewed Lisbon Strategy
In 2006, the European Council adopted four priority areas of the renewed LisbonStrategy. At the 2008 spring summit, the Council reiterated those priorities andkept the integrated planning guidelines pertaining to the method of the Member
Sates achieving the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy essentially unchanged. Despite
that, the accents on those objectives are shifting as the time goes by. Main priorities of 
the currently binding Lisbon Strategy and principal trends in planning changes are
discussed below. 
(1) The European Commission places the priority of investment in the human
capital and modernization of the labour market before other priorities. This is an 
area where the situation has improved the most in the past few years. The focus
continues to be put on achieving a greater flexibility of the labour market and higher 
mobility of the labour force on the common market. At the same time, the European
policy aims at ensuring a high level of employment security for citizens, for
example by making it easier to find a new job and stimulating the demand for jobs.
That policy includes proposals of educational activities, occupational training, etc.
A certain novelty in 2008 is the declaration of working out a common migration
policy and shaping human resources on the EU labour market in relation to that
policy. In addition, the discussed priority is to be supplemented by activities
pertaining to demographic issues and the inter-cultural dialogue. An interesting
aspect of these strategic measures lies in an increasingly visible trend towards
shaping a European family policy, described in the Council’s document as the
European Alliance for Families. Measures related to this area were also introduced
in the renewed Lisbon Strategy. Among other things, they cover an easier access to
childcare and providing men and women with the possibility of reconciling work
with private and family life.
(2) The second priority of the renewed Lisbon Strategy is freeing the economic
potential, particularly of small- and medium-sized enterprises. Among the most
important objectives of that priority was the adoption of the European Charter for
Small Enterprises. It is to constitute a framework for regulatory solutions and public
policies in the Member States meant to stimulate entrepreneurship. An important
objective also rests in the reduction of the administrative burden in individual
Member States and at the EU level. Among other things, it was reiterated that volume
of EU regulations pertaining to enterprises would be reduced by 25% up to 2012 and
procedures associated with European assistance programs would be simplified. There 
would be continued work on the implementation of the directive on services and
modernization of public administrations with a view to improve their handling of
enterprises. Moreover, there would be continued effort to further liberalize financial
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services and increase the accessibility of credit instruments for small- and
medium-sized enterprises.
(3) Only the third place among European Commission proposals presented to the 
Council is held by the priority supporting the growth of knowledge and
innovation. The limited effectiveness of the implementation of that objective is
possibly responsible for decreased interest in supporting this developmental
direction. A novel aspect of that priority rests in increasing the freedom of the flow
of knowledge, particularly the flow of scientists between various centres in the
European Union. In this connection, a new term of “fifth freedom” was even coined, 
referring to the free flow of knowledge on the Common Market. European
institutions continue to declare their commitment to developing the European
research space, create the most advanced research infrastructure and support highly
competitive research projects. On the other hand, there is no information on
supporting innovation development in states and regions that are lagging behind,
despite the fact that one of the principal sore spots of the EU in this area is the huge
gap in the development of innovative economy between different parts of united
Europe. There is more talk about efforts to integrate patent protection systems and
introduce a uniform and affordable European patent. The Council is advocating the
speediest possible implementation of the Galileo program and creation of the
European Institute of Innovation and Technology. It proposes to create an
increased-risk capital market for the most innovative enterprises and a high-speed
internet access infrastructure.
(4) The last priority of the re-focused Lisbon Strategy is to turn Europe into an
economy characterized by low carbon dioxide emissions and high energy
efficiency, and to counteract climate change. The main goal of the strategy for the 
next period is to implement a package of greenhouse gas emission regulations,
increase the proportion of energy obtained from renewable resources and create an
internal market of electric power. The nucleus of these regulations is the EU
Emission Trade System. The European Council and Commission propose higher
energy savings also in public administration and when awarding public
procurements.
In summing up European Commission proposals and Council decisions pertaining to
the execution of the Lisbon Strategy in 2008–2010 it is worth noting the increasing
importance of two areas. The first area includes the above-mentioned measures to
counter climate change. They focus on ecological issues and energy saving. The
Council also takes up other issues, such as those associated with energy security and
search for new energy production solutions.
The other important subject of the renewed Lisbon Strategy is the reinforcement of
measures directed outwards, both in bilateral and multilateral relations (known as the
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external dimension of the renewed Lisbon Strategy). It mainly deals with a better
protection of European economic interests, including opening access to markets and
public procurements, enforcement of intellectual property rights, protection of the
EU market against unfair competition. Another EU objective will be to coordinate
international activities aimed at countering climate change, including preparation of
a global agreement on climate change (to be signed at a conference in Copenhagen in
2009). Other external EU activities within the Lisbon Strategy will consist in
offsetting the consequences of the financial market crisis and in managing
immigration. 
All these activities are effects of two processes taking place in the European Union.
One is the perceivable crisis of liberal ideas and arguments meant to guarantee the
success of European economy and its competitiveness on world markets. It is first and 
foremost a response to increasing competition pressure coming from Asian
economies, which are becoming more effective in exploiting the principles of free
trade in their rivalry with European businesses and threaten jobs in the European
Union. The other is the visibly growing importance of government interventionism in
European economic affairs. It shows in the growth of assistance provided by
governments to market financial institutions suffering from the crisis and in
increasingly strong attempts at working out an industrial policy for the EU (the
conclusion of the 2008 EU summit encourages the development of a “new sustainable 
industrial policy”). That tendency is also expressed in the attempts to reinforce EU’s
foreign economic relations in – as the Commission puts it – “the rightful European
interest”.
One may ask when studying the priorities of the renewed Lisbon Strategy for
2008–2010 whether they provide a cohesive vision of the growth of an innovative and 
competitive European economy. Its principal objectives and priorities are the same as
since at least 2006, and next to the activities that promote innovative economy there
are still those which hardly relate to giving life to the new vision of growth.
Increasing importance is given to climatic change and renewable energy, and also to
focusing on foreign policy initiatives. It should be noted that Lisbon objectives
pertaining to innovative economy were so far pursued very weakly because, among
other things, of the improper substantive direction given to the Lisbon Strategy.
Certain problems – e.g. wide disproportions in research & development inside the EU
– are now wider than ever. It is precisely these disproportions and insufficient
involvement of the private sector in scientific research (it is lower than in China, for
example) that prevent the development of European innovation. Therefore, there is
a want for a more focused approach to solving those problems as that would improve
the effectiveness of executing the Lisbon Strategy. Instead, proposals of secondary
importance have found their way into the strategy. For example, in the introduction to
the European Commission communiqué on the future of the Lisbon Strategy,
6 What’s Next for the Lisbon Strategy?
Institute of  Public Affairs Analyses &  Opinions, 3
President J.M. Barroso cited among five ambitious initiatives the need to limit the
number of students who do not graduate from school and to save more energy in
public buildings. Some objectives continue to seem self-contradictory. For example,
limiting the financial burden imposed on enterprises is advocated on one hand, while
expensive energy-related regulations are introduced on the other – and that without
indicating any EU instruments which would facilitate the achievement of these
initiatives in countries experiencing more problems or having smaller budgetary
possibilities.
The persisting fundamental problem with the renewed Lisbon Strategy is the issue of
its ineffective implementation instruments. The open coordination method, on which
that implementation is still based, has proven ineffective. Both the Commission and
the Council recommend more scrupulous methods of coordinating domestic policies
and monitoring the course of execution of domestic reform programs. They
encourage Member States to continue structural reforms. They also propose
a stronger integration of EU policies, including working out a community Lisbon
program modelled on domestic reform programs. The cohesion policy provides
a certain amount of support to the execution of the strategy. 
However, it seems that these instruments are insufficient. There is still a need for
binding coordination mechanisms that are more binding, as well as financial
incentives that would help the implementation of the strategy, particularly in poorer
countries. This is a wider problem of the European Union, whose budget is very low
in relation to needs. Moreover, financial incentives are weak instruments when it
comes to supporting EU’s strategic objectives, and in addition they are strongly
encumbered by past decisions. For example, it would be hard to find a connection
between the Lisbon Strategy and outlays from the common agricultural policy
(approx. 36% of the EU budget for 2007–2013). This is why most expenses
associated with pursuing Lisbon goals falls on domestic budgets, which are not
always capable of bearing the cost of ambitious community objectives.
Certain EU regulatory instruments meant to serve the implementation of the Lisbon
Strategy are also failing. The European patent has not yet been introduced even
though that objective is in the books since at least 2000. Plans pertaining to the
directive on services have not been fully realized, and the Commission is currently
signalling difficulties with a timely implementation of that directive in certain
Member States. In turn, other EU regulatory activities (for example those pertaining
to environmental protection) that will make a major dent in domestic budgets will
further the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy, but may also impede finding public
funds to stimulate research & development in some Member States. Other EU
regulations impede introduction of financial incentives to secure the growth of
research & development in enterprises, which, as stated earlier, is the Achilles’ heel
of the European economy.
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Conclusions and recommendations
The greatest problem with the Lisbon Strategy is the inefficiency of itsimplementation as well as the growing gap between the slogans that promoteit, which whet the public’s appetite, and the deteriorating EU economy. The
protracted ineffectiveness of the Lisbon Strategy is leading to a gradual withdrawal
of political support for the project. If the project fails, it will be a spectacular defeat
both for the strategy and for soft coordination mechanisms in the European Union. 
There exist two fundamental factors conditioning reconstruction of the prestige and
effectiveness of the Lisbon Strategy. Firstly, its management mechanisms must be
changed and there need to be financial incentives from the EU budget injected into
execution of the strategy. That would mean a better inclusion of EU redistribution
policies – particularly the cohesion policy – into the execution of domestic reform
plans. Secondly, Lisbon objectives should be more focused on the priority of building 
an innovative and knowledge-based economy in Europe. For that, the cohesion policy 
would also have to be appropriately adjusted. 
The Polish position on the future of the cohesion policy points at the need to
concentrate it on a limited number of objectives. This is correct, but in the light of
what has been said earlier, the cohesion policy must be focused on supporting
measures aimed at innovation and growth of a knowledge-based economy. Poland
may back the proposal for increasing the scale of investments into R&D (and
innovation) by 20% of structural fund allocations. It is a response to the
recommendation of the autumn summit of the European Council in Hampton Court
(2005), which advised Member States to voluntarily plan that level of expenditures
within the structural funds available for innovation purposes. 
The cohesion policy has become an important, albeit still insufficient, instrument of
achieving the goals of the Lisbon Strategy. However, it should be remembered that
not all goals of the strategy serve the purpose of stimulating innovation and,
particularly, not all back the growth of an innovative economy. This is why it should
be made certain that markers specifying the status of advancement of Lisbon
objectives precisely reflect the level of building an innovative economy rather than
serving the ends of political marketing. 
All available studies clearly indicate that the new Member States and their regions fall 
behind the rest of Europe in terms of development of an innovative economy and
involvement in scientific research. Moreover, they also fall behind West European
countries and regions in terms of implementing innovation measures within the
Lisbon Strategy and exploiting structural funds. This indicates the need to intensify
the activities of the Lisbon Strategy and European policies aimed at promoting
innovation particularly in the new Member States. 
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Equalizing the level of development of an innovative economy in Europe is of
strategic importance to the welfare of the entire Europe and not only of the countries
lagging behind. That is because it creates an opportunity for permanent development
in problem regions. Without such policy, problem regions will require important
public assistance, including transfers of social benefits, and will be exposed to
various political difficulties associated with the poor economic and social situation.
The development of an innovative economy in those regions will improve European
competitiveness and clearly redirect the developmental model towards innovation
(rather than, for example, cheap labour force or natural resources). Without the
support of the cohesion policy it is hard to expect the realization of that
developmental direction and improvement in the effectiveness of the execution of the
Lisbon Strategy.
Worthy of stressing is the positive experience of the cohesion policy in stimulating
the development of a knowledge-based economy. Structural funds are an important
method of mobilizing public and private funds to advance innovation measures and, 
as a rule, are the main source of financing that developmental direction in regions
that are developing the slowest. When there are no innovation measures financed by 
EU resources, domestic policies (regional or sectoral) do not fill that gap.
Furthermore, studies clearly show that the execution of innovation activities in
regions lagging behind does not cause any difficulties associated with the
absorption of EU resources.
Bearing this in mind, the Polish government should be postulating a redirection of the
cohesion policy at achieving a greater cohesion on the European scale in the area of
development of an innovative economy. Such approach broadens and reinterprets the
treaty meaning of that policy in respect of economic, social and territorial cohesion. It 
is because it puts a stress on innovation, both in terms of building an innovative
economy, innovative society, and in terms of an integrated approach to territorial
development aimed at introducing innovation in the broad sense of the term. 
EU documents disclose a tendency to differentiate between instruments of support of
the cohesion policy in regions that are developing the quickest and the slowest. In
respect of the quickest developing regions, owing to their higher scientific research
potential, suggested additional assistance focuses on the development of
technological innovation, support for the development of regional technological
clusters and search for greater synergy between these activities and frame programs.
However, in relation to the second category, the accent has been placed on the
development of non-technological innovation, particularly in the traditional areas of
economy associated with agriculture, forestry, tourism, etc. Also proposed is
a stronger development of Lisbon investments, which, however, do not contribute
enough to the development of an innovative economy. 
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It seems that such division would in a long term be an insufficient method of assisting
development in the weaker countries and regions, particularly in the new Member
States. Non-technological investments should not replace but supplement the
activities associated with development of new technologies and developmental
research. Of course, the main problem in slower developing countries is the low
potential for executing more ambitious technological tasks. Therefore, the best
solution lies in a double-track approach consisting in assistance provided in those
countries and regions simultaneously to the development of non-technological
innovation and to gradual building of the R&D potential, which in the future will
allow these countries and regions to embark on activities associated with new
technologies and developmental research. Consequently, placing the European
Institute of Innovation and Technology in Wroc³aw would constitute EU’s long-term
investment, which could contribute to shifting the impetus of innovation
development to the new Member States.
An innovative approach to the cohesion policy can reinforce it conceptually as well as 
politically. It can contribute to executing the Lisbon Strategy in a more effective
manner and to solving social problems, which is beneficial to the reception of
European integration by the population. An example of this is the search for
innovative energy solutions. On one hand, they will be able to meet the growing
energy needs of the EU economy, on the other they will take into account the
requirements of environmental protection and, on the third, they will increase energy
security of the European states, for example by reducing their dependence on foreign
supplies of traditional raw materials. They also may reduce the cost of adapting to the
package of EU climate change regulations. That direction of activities is consistent
with the evolution of the priorities of the renewed Lisbon Strategy (for 2008–2010).
Consequently, it makes sense to take advantage of the EU interest in energy problems
and appropriately direct the execution of Lisbon objectives. The inclusion of the
cohesion policy in this type of innovation activities (both at the level of searching for
new energy technologies and of putting them to use in the economy) lies in the Polish
interest. Therefore, measures should be taken to ensure that these activities can be
conducted also in Polish regions after 2013. 
The policy of the Polish government should also take into account another political
trend in the renewed Lisbon Strategy, i.e. a stronger accent placed on outward
activities. In this context, a great deal of importance should be given to the attempts of 
easing trade barriers with Russia. Furthermore, there is a need for an in-depth analysis 
of other trade interests of the Polish economy and for their more assertive
presentation on the European forum.
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